What makes humanity humane by Pribram, Karl H
BioMed  Central
Page 1 of 7
(page number not for citation purposes)
Journal of Biomedical Discovery and 
Collaboration
Open Access Focus
What makes humanity humane
Karl H Pribram*
Address: Cognitive Neuroscience, Department of Psychology Georgetown University, 37th and O Streets, Washington, DC 20057-1001, USA
Email: Karl H Pribram* - pribramk@georgetown.edu
* Corresponding author    
Abstract
Scientific and popular lore have promulgated a connection between emotion and the limbic forebrain.
However, there are a variety of structures that are considered limbic, and disagreement as to what is meant
by "emotion". This essay traces the initial studies upon which the connection between emotion and the
limbic forebrain was based and how subsequent experimental evidence led to confusion both with regard
to brain systems and to the behaviors examined. In the process of sorting out the bases of the confusion
the following rough outlines are sketched: 1) Motivation and emotion need to be distinguished. 2)
Motivation and emotion are processed by the basal ganglia; motivation by the striatum and related
structures, emotion by limbic basal ganglia: the amygdala and related structures. 3) The striatum processes
activation of readiness, both behavioral and perceptual; the amygdala processes arousal, an intensive
dimension that varies from interest to panic. 4) Activation of readiness deals with "what to do?" Arousal
deals with novelty, with "what is it?" 5) Thus both motivation and emotion are the proactive aspects of
representations, of memory: motivation, an activation of readiness; emotion, a processing of novelty, a
departure from the familiar. 6) The hippocampal-cingulate circuit deals with efficiently relating emotion and
motivation by establishing dispositions, attitudes. 7) The prefrontal cortex fine-tunes motivation, emotion
and attitude when choices among complex or ambiguous circumstances are made.
Introduction
Reviewing what I wrote more than three decades ago [1]
makes me exclaim: It's pretty damn good. Who wrote this?
I'm sure many of you have had this feeling about some-
thing that you composed some time ago.
Almost everything I wrote back in 1970 I'll vouch for
today – and in some cases the earlier statements express
my ideas better than I am doing currently. A case in point,
one that I am going to pursue in this essay, concerns the
topic "coding". I had forgotten that, what today I have
been subsuming under the rubrics "complexity", "non-
linear dynamics" and "chaos theory" is in fact what codes
are all about.
In the original essay I failed to distinguish novelty from
information. Daniel Berlyne based a good deal of his
career on the commonly held idea that novelty provides
information in the arts and sciences. Here I want to draw
a distinction between these two concepts because I can
discern different brain systems that are involved in one
process that can be defined as "novelty" and another that
can be defined as "information."
I am going to use the term "novel" much as we use the
term to describe a literary novel. The essence of a novel is
its complexity, its restructuring of the familiar. In contrast,
I will use the term "information" in the restricted fashion
as it was defined by Shannon and Weaver: that is, as a
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measure of "reduction of uncertainty" – which I will use
as an alternative description to "information."
For decades I was uncomfortable about equating novelty
and uncertainty reduction, because "information process-
ing" in the Shannon and Weaver sense entails the opera-
tion of the posterior convexity of the brain while the
processing of "novelty and familiarization" involves the
brain's fronto-limbic formations. Resolution of my dis-
comfort came from an experiment performed in Belgium
by G. Smets [2]. Smets constructed two different sets of
displays: in one set, from trial to trial, he changed the
number items displayed but kept the arrangement of
items essentially the same. In the other set he kept the
number of items constant but changed the arrangement of
the items. Human subjects were asked to say which set of
displays was the more aesthetically interesting. During the
testing, heart and respiratory rate, blood pressure and
some simple brain electrical readings were recorded.
The results of the study were conclusive: changing the pat-
tern, the arrangement of the items in the display was
much more interesting and was accompanied by body
and brain changes that are usually called "arousal" and
"activation". Adding or subtracting items from the display
proved to evoke little interest or body response.
Smets described his displays in information theoretic
terms: Adding and subtracting items increased or decreased the
amount of uncertainty, the amount of potential information, in
the displays. Changing the arrangement of the items in the dis-
play was a change from the familiar: the new arrangement was
perceived as novel and interesting.
The issue
The issue is not as abstract and dry as it sounds. What is at
stake is a specific kind of process that makes mankind all
too human: feelings. Feelings, emotional and motiva-
tional, were not covered in the original "What Makes Man
Human" despite my having spent a good part of my
research career exploring the brain processes involved in
emotions and motivations. Here I want to make up for
this neglect by charting the far from straightforward
course of the experiments on attention that lead to a real-
ization of the import of those results for understanding
emotional and motivational feelings.
My research, as had the research of many others, ran into
a puzzle: Whenever an attempt was made to use body
responses to measure an emotional process, the results
told us little if anything about emotion but a great deal
about attention. Don Lindsley, on the basis of his work on
the reticular activating core of the brain stem, had pro-
posed an activation theory of emotion in which emotion
was conceived as an overall undifferentiated attentive
conscious process [3]. When the reticular core of the brain
stem was destroyed animals and humans survived but in
a vegetative state of "akinetic mutism". The experimental
results obtained by Smets on studying the reaction to
changes in pattern had little in common with Lindsley's
activation process: Rather, these experiments targeted
attention to specific aspects of experience once general
activation had been achieved.
I was doing experiments on humans and non-human pri-
mates that paralleled those performed by Smets. My
experiments were stimulated by the work of Eugene
Sokolov who showed that such body and brain responses
indicated that a representation, a "neuronal model," of
the pattern of stimulation was constructed during famil-
iarization [4]. When monkeys or people were exposed to
visual or auditory displays in which a change in pattern of
the display was made, body responses identical to those
measured by Smets (changes in heart and respiratory rate
and blood pressure) were activated. These responses
waned with repetition; as the patterns became familiar the
responses habituated.
Earlier, in an exploration of the idea that body responses
are integral to feelings of emotion and motivation, my
research had shown, in both human and non-human pri-
mates, that electrical stimulation of a stretch of cortex
along the medial and basal surface of the brain cortex
resulted in changes in blood pressure, heart and respira-
tory rate, gastrointestinal motility and some gross head
and eye movements. I labeled this cortex the mediobasal
motor cortex to distinguish it from the classical motor cor-
tex on the lateral surface of the brain. Today we would call
it the limbic motor cortex.
The basal part of this limbic motor cortex is critically con-
nected to the amygdala, a basal ganglion shaped like an
almond, located at, and within, the tip of the temporal
lobe of the brain.
The results of these earlier experiments that discovered the
limbic motor cortex made me wonder whether the
Sokolov responses to changes in patterns of stimuli
depended on the occurrence of body responses. I there-
fore removed the amygdala on both sides of the monkeys'
brains to see what would happen to body responses [5,6].
To my surprise there was no change in body responses: the
body responses occurred just as they had before surgery – and,
moreover, they persisted with repetition of the stimulus. After
the amygdalectomy, the body responses did not habituate.
Habituation, familiarization was thus shown to be
dependent on the presence of an intact amygdala, a sys-
tem able to process body responses. The amygdala was
not involved in the production of those body responses,Journal of Biomedical Discovery and Collaboration 2006, 1:14 http://www.j-biomed-discovery.com/content/1/1/14
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nor, in other experiments, was the threshold to pain
altered. Rather the amygdala was shown to be important
to processing an experience. An experience consisted of an
exposure to a change in a pattern that had become famil-
iar. The experience may have been painful or potentially
painful; or pleasant or potentially pleasant.
In some experiments we used Pavlovian classical condi-
tioning techniques and showed that amygdalectomized
monkeys failed to become conditioned [7]. This was due
on the part of the amygdalectomized monkeys – when
compared to control monkeys – to have a narrowed win-
dow of response to the unconditioned stimulus so that a
conjunction with the conditional stimulus failed to occur.
The current emphasis on the role of the amygdala in the
processing of fear is understandable but addresses only
one facet of processing by the amygdala system. Fear is not
an expression of an experience of pain but a memory
based anticipation of pain that may be realistic or imag-
ined.
Since William James, scientists and philosophers have sug-
gested that emotional experiences and expressions per se, are
accompanied by – and even initiated by – body responses. But
the results of my experiments indicate that body responses help
a person attain, via the amygdala, a certain kind of memory,
and that emotion is due to a challenge to the pattern of that
memory, not the body responses themselves. When we experi-
ence a stomach ache we do not identify that experience to be an
emotion.
How it all began: origins of confusion
My interest in the amygdala and emotions stemmed from
the experimental finding reported by Heinrich Klüver and
Paul Bucy of marked taming of monkeys produced by
excision of their temporal lobes [8]. (I was Bucy's first res-
ident when he began his private practice of neurosurgery).
I undertook a program of research to find out which struc-
ture of the temporal lobe was responsible for producing
the taming. The program also sought to find out which of
the other symptoms produced by the temporal lobectomy
were produced by which part of the lobe. I found that not
only taming but also other "basic instincts" – the 4 Fs:
fighting, fleeing, feeding and sex – were dramatically
altered by removal of the amygdala, though not by
removal of any other part of the temporal lobe. A further
series of experiments, some of which were reviewed
above, showed that the changes in the expression of basic
instincts were due to changes in an animals' processing of
familiarity.
Those experimental results were complemented by electri-
cal stimulations. Electrical stimulation of the amygdala of
animals and people has produced, in ascending order of
the amount of stimulation (applied randomly), reactions
that range from momentary to prolonged interest; to
approaching conspecifics as in sexual mounting or flirt-
ing; to retreating from the environment; to outbursts of
attack, labeled "sham rage".
In short, although processing the content of familiarity is
highly specific, the response engendered varies along an
intensive dimension reaching from interest to rage. There
are, of course, many more experimental results that flesh
out the skeleton described in the above review. But this is
enough to provide a kernel to the popularly accepted idea
that the limbic systems contain "centers" for regulating
emotions such as fear – the "fleeing" of the 4 Fs.
But the popular view has built in some difficulties. The
amygdala is only one structure among those that are
loosely thought of as the limbic forebrain. In fact, origi-
nally the amygdala was not included at all in the limbic
circuitry. Rather, two sources converged to be baptized by
Paul MacLean as the "limbic systems." One source was
Paul Broca who discerned a rim of cortex around the inter-
nal edge of the cerebral hemisphere to be different from
the rest of the cerebral mantle. This cortex appeared paler
and was later shown to be composed of only three layers
and labeled "allo (other) cortex" to distinguish it from the
six layered "eu (true) cortex" that makes up most of the
cerebral mantle. Broca called this rim of cortex "Le Grand
Lobe Limbique."
The other source, described by J.W. Papez, consisted of the
hippocampus, its downstream connections through the
septal region to the mammillary bodies of the hypothala-
mus, thence to the anterior nuclei of the thalamus that
project to the cortex of the cingulate gyrus which had been
labeled the "limbic" cortex. The cingulate cortex in turn
feeds back into the hippocampus. Papez reasoned that
emotions tend to go round and round and this anatomi-
cal circuit does just that [9]. MacLean's limbic system
encompassed Broca's cortex and Papez's circuitry and
originally did not include the amygdala. It was not until
MacLean joined my project in John Fulton's department
at Yale that it became imperative on the basis of my results
to include the amygdala in any circuitry that presumably
organizes our emotions.
I had summarized my early experimental results in a
paper written with one of my students, Larry Kruger, titled
"Functions of the Olfactory Brain" for which we received
more than 2000 reprint requests [10]. In this paper we
noted that Broca's limbic three-layered allocortex had, for
anatomical reasons, to be expanded in primates to
include adjacent new six layered cortex. Filimonov, a Rus-
sian neuroanatomist whom I went to visit in Moscow, had
labeled these new six layered accretions "juxtallocortex"Journal of Biomedical Discovery and Collaboration 2006, 1:14 http://www.j-biomed-discovery.com/content/1/1/14
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(next to the allocortex). My electrical and chemical stimu-
lations as well as the results of my behavioral experiments
supported the unity in function of these old and new pri-
mate cortical zones. The most clear-cut of these zones sur-
rounded the amygdala which had, therefore, to be
included in Broca's, if not in Papez's Limbic brain.
The stage was set for the confusion that has occurred between
actual experimental results and the popular and much of the
scientific understanding of the relation between emotion and
the limbic systems. Experiments and anatomical analyses
showed the limbic brain to be not just an old brain but in pri-
mates to contain neocortical zones. Furthermore, the functions
of the amygdala system proved to have more to do with atten-
tion and the formation of memory than with emotion. This con-
fusion is multiplied by the ambiguity of the use of the term
"feeling" in English. Most often "feeling" and "emotion" are
used synonymously. At other times, especially by scientists, feel-
ing is used as the subjective aspect of emotion and motivation.
Stop and go
The confusion can be resolved and in the resolution new
insights are gained. We have already noted that stimula-
tions and damage to the amygdala entail familiarization
of an experience. Familiarization leads to a memory that
is challenged by a novel, a change in a familiar, pattern.
The challenge elicits a response that varies in intensity
according to the properties of the novel stimulus.
Challenge of the familiar interrupts ongoing behavior.
The interruption has been described as a "What is it?"
reaction. This initial response to novelty is most often fol-
lowed by a "What to do?" reaction. "What to do?" engages
basal ganglia other than the amygdala: the corpus stria-
tum composed of the caudate nucleus and the putamen.
Nico Spinelli and I found that electrical stimulation of the
caudate nucleus and of the putamen changes recovery
cycles of event related potentials and inhibitory surrounds
of receptive fields in the visual system [11]. These basal
ganglia are thus engaged not only in regulating postural
set as is well known, but also in changing "settings" of sen-
sory inputs in processing "what to do".
William James contrasted emotions that "stop at the skin"
with instinct, that is motivations, that "get into practical
relations with the environment". Getting into practical
relations entails readiness and behavioral involvement,
the operations regulated by the striatum, the non-limbic
basal ganglia.
Thus when we talk of feelings in the sense that they
encompass both emotions and motivations, we need to
keep in mind that basal ganglia other than limbic are of
concern. Were we to do this, one area of confusion would
become clarified.
The experimental results reviewed above can be encapsu-
lated by stating that the amygdala is part of a stop system
that processes interruptions of ongoing behavior and
experience; that the basal ganglia of the corpus striatum
are part of a go system that readies the organism to effec-
tively initiate or continue involvement in behaving and
experiencing. The conclusions with respect to go process-
ing are borne out by patients with Parkinson's disease
who have difficulty in starting and maintaining their
interests and their behavior.
With regard to stop processing, experimental results show
that persons, monkeys and dogs whose amygdala have
been removed fail to establish bounds on their ongoing
behavior. Amygdalectomized animals fail to respect ordi-
nary familiar territorial boundaries on their sexual behav-
ior and treat every social encounter as novel, failing to
heed interactions that had become familiar.
We obtained the most detailed evidence of how failure to
heed bounds on behavior in experiments and observa-
tions of eating. Amygdalized dogs, monkeys and people
do not eat more vigorously than controls after being
deprived of food, or when given greater incentive to eat,
but whenever food is available they fail to curtail eating
and persist longer in feeding.
Anatomically the amygdala is heavily connected by way of
two large pathways with the ventromedial "nucleus" of
the hypothalamus, a region that has been identified as
regulating satiety. When the ventromedial nucleus is
destroyed animals eat and eat and eat. Their "stop" proc-
ess has been removed. Interestingly, the same sequence of
responses as is observed for the amygdala is observed with
electrical stimulation of this hypothalamic nucleus. Thus
an intensive dimension, regulated by the brain, ranges
from satiety (boredom?), through interest, approach,
avoidance, and to explosive attack. This dimension is truly
what we can identify as emotion.
At the hypothalamic level a "go" process has also been
identified in what is called its far lateral region. Lesions of
this region produce animals that won't eat at all – and will
starve. In this location there is no hypothalamic nucleus,
but there are tracts leading from the substantia nigra to the
striatal basal ganglia. These tracts are dopaminergic and
are involved in the production of Parkinson's disease.
Microelectrode experiments have shown that activity in
the ventromedial and far lateral hypothalamic regions is
reciprocal.
A patient who had sustained an amygdalectomy illustrates
this syndrome. She had gained some 50 lbs. in the six
months since surgery. Her nursing records showed thatJournal of Biomedical Discovery and Collaboration 2006, 1:14 http://www.j-biomed-discovery.com/content/1/1/14
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she chewed and ate whatever was before her including
paper and pencils. I was examining her shortly before
noon and asked her why she put things in her mouth –
whether she remained inordinately hungry. She answered
a definite no. I then asked if she had any specific appetites
such as steak or chocolate. Again a definite no. I had so
hoped that this talking primate could tell me what my
non-talking monkeys could not.
I opened the door of the examining room that fortunately
for my inquiry led to the common room where lunch was
being served. The patient slowly made her way to the
table, but when she got there she pushed other patients
aside, and grabbed food with both hands and began to
stuff herself. I brought her back to the examining room
and asked why she had behaved the way she did. She
could not tell me. As a behaviorist, I learned an important
lesson which most ordinary people already know: Human
behavior is not necessarily a reliable guide to human sub-
jective experience. In the epilogue of our 1960 book Plans
and the Structure of Behavior [12], George Miller, Eugene
Galanter and I called ourselves "Subjective Behaviorists",
an oxymoron at the time.
The experimental results that I have reviewed show that certain
brain systems, centered on the amygdala, regulate an intensive
dimension of responses to external or body stimulation, a
dimension of response that we can identify as emotion. These
responses are bounded by what has become familiar. Another
set of responses involving the caudate and putamen, process
motivated behaviors that bring the animal or person into prac-
tical relations with the environment.
Both emotional and motivational systems of the brain have
been shown to influence sensory processes. This influence
accounts for their subjective, feeling aspects.
The hippocampal circuit
The experimental results reviewed should resolve much of
the current confusion that is glossed over by simply relat-
ing "emotions" to "the limbic system". But what about the
Papez hippocampal-cingulate circuit? Just as in the case of
research on the amygdala, almost all research on damage
to the hippocampus has devolved on the finding of a very
specific type of memory loss: the memory of what is happen-
ing to the patient personally fails to become familiar. Again it
is memory, and familiarity, not the processing of informa-
tion, or for that matter of emotion, that is involved.
However, the processing of what is familiar is different for
the hippocampal system than for the amygdala system. A
series of experiments in my laboratory demonstrated that
while the amygdala is processing what is novel during
habituation, the hippocampus is processing the context
within which habituation is happening: the hippocampus
is processing what is already familiar. In a learning task,
when a monkey is choosing between a "plus" and a
"minus" and choosing the "plus" is always rewarded irre-
spective of where it is placed, the amygdala is processing
choosing the "plus", the hippocampus is processing not-choos-
ing the "minus", the non-rewarded cue. This was a surpris-
ing result for our group until we realized that in order to
walk through a door we must process the walls so as to not
bump into them. Our experience with familiar walls has
become, for the moment, irrelevant, no longer "elevated"
in attention. We no longer are interested in walls unless
there occurs an earthquake in which instance our experi-
ence of the walls promptly dis-habituates and re-elevates
into attention. The memory of walls and of the minus cue
does not disappear during habituation and learning.
From all these results we could almost be ready to dismiss
the hippocampal-cingulate circuit from the "limbic sys-
tems process emotions" idea. Almost but not quite: In one
experiment I reversed what had been the rewarded cue
after criterion performance had been reached – the reward
was switched from "plus" to "minus." Monkeys with hip-
pocampal removals had no problem in reversing their
performance but once they reached a 50% level of reward
they were stuck at that level for weeks [13]. It seemed that
they were insufficiently motivated to try for a more sub-
stantial level of reward. After such a period of 50% per-
formance, the monkeys took off and completed the task
to a 90% performance level. The slopes of achieving 50%
and 90% were normal; only that long period in the mid-
dle was different. My interpretation was that at the 50%
level of reward the new build-up of "not-choosing" had
not proceeded sufficiently to counter the context of "not-
choosing" from the pre-reversal stage of the experiment to
kick the monkey into a more productive motivational
phase. Support for this interpretation came from the find-
ing that over progressive reversals the mid-plateau of 50%
performance became progressively shorter.
In another experiment, monkeys whose cingulate cortex I
had removed showed a dramatic shortening of the dura-
tion of their frustration to a sudden cessation of expected
rewards [14]. Frustration occurs when an always-rewarded
situation becomes suddenly an always unrewarded one.
The "unrewarded" context is suddenly overwhelmed with
a new pattern. This is more like a change in the intensive
dimension that characterizes emotion than in a change in
motivation.
But there is more. The hippocampus processes hormones
that organize the pituitary regulation of adrenal cortical
hormones which in turn are processed by the hippocam-
pus. Thus the anatomy and physiology of the adrenal
gland is reflected in the anatomy and physiology of the
amygdala circuit and the hippocampal circuit: AdrenalinJournal of Biomedical Discovery and Collaboration 2006, 1:14 http://www.j-biomed-discovery.com/content/1/1/14
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(epinephrine) secreted by the adrenal core is processed by
the amygdala system; cortisone secreted by adrenal cortex
is processed by the hippocampal system.
Adrenal cortical hormones have a great deal to do with
motivation. Treatment with these hormones, which are
closely related to sex hormones, produces a feeling of
euphoria, of gung-ho to do things. However, prolonged
excretion of adrenal cortical hormones that occurs as a
result of undue stress produces ennui and depression. The
effect of hippocampal processing on motivation thus pro-
vides the context of specific patterns that are currently
"irrelevant" but expresses the motivation along an inten-
sive dimension, much as does the processing of emotions
by the amygdala.
Two different patterns of electrical activity have been
recorded from the hippocampus. One patterns occurs
when the animal alerts to a stimulus, when "what is it"? is
being processed. The other pattern is present when an ani-
mal is exploring its environment, when "what to" do
might be or might become of concern [15].
Taken together these experiments indicate that the hippocampal
circuit brings together emotion: the processing of familiarity;
and motivation: the processing of readiness to engage the world
in a practical manner.
Attitude
There is a final step in this hegira regarding the limbic sys-
tems and emotions. I had been attracted to Sigmund
Freud's Project for a Scientific Psychology in part because in
the Project Freud developed a theory of motivation based
on memory rather than on drives. Freud noted that moti-
vations are the prospective aspects of memories. As described
in Chapter 2 of Freud's Project Reassessed, Freud located
motivation in the basal ganglia and drew a diagram of
what today we would call a neural network [16].
In writing up my comments on the functions of the amy-
gdala, their role in familiarization, a memory process, I
suddenly realized that we could conceive of emotions as the
prospective aspects of familiarization much as Freud had con-
ceived of motivation as the prospective aspects of memories.
Attitudes are prospective feelings. Motivational attitudes
entail striatal processing; emotional attitudes entail amy-
gdala processes and efficiently combining motivational
and emotional attitudes entails processing by the hippoc-
ampal circuit.
Attitudes are dispositional states that embody the experi-
ence of the individual (in compressed form). Attitudes are
formed and reformed (reset) by structuring redundancy:
each level of repetition is re-presented at the next level by
a single symbol – and this process continues until all rep-
etitions have been accounted for. In short, attitudes
embody complexity, attitudes embody codes. In chapter 9
of Brain and Perception I have reviewed preliminary evi-
dence of how the hippocampal circuit is involved in the
construction of codes [17]. More recently, J. McClelland
has created a model that shows how isocortical input
becomes processed by the hippocampus, is then for-
warded back to the isocortex to be interleaved into ongo-
ing processing. In an interchange (1988) between
McClelland and myself I indicated that the return to the
isocortex needs to proceed via the basal ganglia [18].
In the presence of ambiguity, when choices are less than
straightforward, attitudes come under the control of divi-
sions of the frontal cortex, one division monitoring amy-
gdala, another monitoring striatal and still another,
hippocampal circuits.
Recently much attention has been paid to the involve-
ment of emotional processes in cognitive functions [e.g.,
[19]]. An excellent example is a recent report in Science
[20] that describes the selective activation of the amygdala,
shown by functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging
(fMRI), in what Kahneman and Tversky have called a
"framing effect" [21]. The frame is, of course, the context
of "what isn't" that I have described in this essay. The Sci-
ence report therefore supports what I described earlier, on
the basis of my experimental results, as "placing bounds,
boundaries" on experience and behavior. The report also
supports the conclusion that divisions of the frontal cor-
tex become activated in modulating the framing effect.
As my brief review indicates, when brain processes are consid-
ered, the involvement of feelings with reasoning and choice is
much more intimate and intricate than we had suspected:
"What Makes Man Human" is the humane-ness of his brain.
Suggested readings
I have chosen references 22–29 [22-29] as seminal to the
themes covered in this essay. References 22–26 [22-26]
are early studies that have become almost totally lost to
current thinking about emotion and motivation. Refer-
ences 27–29 [27-29] are papers that have contributed and
are contributing important insights to our understanding
of What Makes Humanity Humane.
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